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The rise of Euroscepticism and how to 
deal with it in the EU
Mark Leonard1
Narrative 
Over the last couple of years, I’ve been talking to some of 
the key figures inside the new Eurosceptic movement in the 
UK, trying to understand their arguments, the way they have 
shifted the political debate, and where Britain’s unpredict-
able flirting with the exit might lead. 
One big point stands out from all the interviews I have con-
ducted. The Eurosceptics are accused of wanting to take 
the country back to the 1950s, perhaps the 1850s. But the 
uncomfortable truth is that they have done more to mod-
ernise their arguments and broaden their coalition than the 
pro-Europeans. When the euro crisis struck, they seized their 
chance, rather like the neo-cons did over Iraq after 9/11.   
Meanwhile, the pro-European coalition has shrunk and 
failed to reinvent itself for a new world.  What is so puzzling 
to the pro-European elite is that it is their proudest achieve-
ments – helping to create Europe’s single market, fostering a 
European trade agenda and championing the enlargement to 
the east – that are now the most powerful arguments against 
the EU.  
The genius of the Eurosceptics has been their ability to turn 
the arguments of pro-Europeans on their head – so that each 
triumph has become an argument against the EU. 
Adam Lury – the thoughtful ex-ad man who once helped New 
Labour think about communications – thinks that Europe 
is one of those issues where public attitudes are motivated 
by identity and values as much as by traditional metrics of 
class or financial interest. Following the work of the Ameri-
can “humanistic” psychologist Abraham Maslow who wrote 
about a “hierarchy of needs” in the 1950s, sociologists and 
pollsters tend to segment the public into three main tribes.
 First, the “settlers” who make up 30 per cent of the British 
population according to Cultural Dynamics’ British Values 
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Introduction
It used to be seen as a British disease, but Euroscepticism has 
spread like a virus across the continent – infecting creditors, 
debtors, would-be euro-members and outs alike. 
Trust in the European project has fallen even faster than 
European interest rates. Since the beginning of the crisis, 
France losses 32 points, Germany -49, Italy -52, Spain -98, 
Poland -44, UK –36.
The damage is so deep that it does not matter whether coun-
tries are creditors, debtor countries, would-be members of 
the euro or countries with opt-outs: everybody is worse off.  
Back in 2007, people thought that the UK, which scored 
minus 13 points in trust, was the Eurosceptic outlier. Now, 
the four members of the eurozone come in well below Britain 
in their trust for EU institutions: Germany -29, France and 
Italy -22, Spain -52. What is happening?
I think there is a fundamental crisis at the level of narrative 
for Europe, in the nature of the EU project and  in political 
organization at a national level.
1 This brief tried to bring together some of the work I have been 
doing on this topic over the last two years. It draws heavily on 
three articles I have written on different aspects of Euroscepti-
cism. Firstly, a paper I co-wrote with Jose Ignacio Torreblanca 
(The Euro-sceptic surge, ECFR 2014); a long essay on the new 
Euroscepticism I wrote for the New Statesman (“Its No again to 
all things euro”), and an essay I wrote for the New Statesman on 
the European Elections (Rage Against the Machine). I am also 
grateful to Jose-Ignacio Torreblanca for allowing me to use some 
of our jointly written material.  He has been a key intellectual 
partner in this project.
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Surveys. They are naturally conservative focused on safety, 
security and belonging.  
The next group are “prospectors” who want to maximise their 
wealth and seek opportunity for personal advancement, who 
make up 30 per cent of the population.  
Finally, are the pioneers who also make up 40 percent. They 
have satisfied their material needs and are interested in 
self-actualisation and concerned about the big picture. Lury 
points out, that the power of the pro-Europeans was that they 
developed a case for British Membership that appealed to all 
three. For the settlers, the EU offered peace and stability.  For 
prospectors the single market promised jobs and prosperity. 
And for pioneers, it was exotic and exciting.  
But today, it is the eurosceptics that have found arguments 
against Europe that appeal to all three tribes.
UKIP (UK Independence Party) and Nigel Farage appeal to set-
tlers. They claim that rather than offering peace and security, 
the EU has deprived us of control of our borders and flooded 
our communities with migrants who drive down wages, 
inflate housing prices and put pressure on local schools and 
hospitals. UKIP claims to talk for the settled majority, but 
it adopts the rhetoric and tactics of an oppressed minority 
with its talk of “self-government” and independence. Farage 
claims that his goal is more about changing minds than cap-
turing seats. 
The conservative eurosceptics appeal to prospectors.  Rather 
than accepting the economic arguments for the EU, they have 
a narrative about Britain “tethered to the corpse” of the euro 
zone. They claim that the single market ties British busi-
ness in red tape; the Customs Union holds Britain hostage 
to the protectionist lobbies of all member states.  And there 
constant repletion of these themes plays through into public 
opinion. For example, a YouGov poll in October 2013 found 
that 32% think leaving the EU would be good for British jobs, 
with 31% believe it would be bad for British jobs and the 
remaining third thinking it would make no difference. The 
same poll found that 34% think Britain would be economi-
cally better off outside the EU, 34% think we would be worse 
off and the rest that it would make no difference.
The most surprising development is the Eurosceptic appeal 
to pioneers.  The UKIP MP, Douglas Carswell, claims that the 
EU is not modern and exotic.  He says it is a project that has 
failed; that the EU is provincial and old-fashioned; a fossil-
ized relic of the 20th century in a new digital world. What 
matters to the his brand of skeptics is “not post-colonial reach 
or the ability to fight alongside America in military interven-
tions, but the real freedom to trade globally”. They ask: 
“What is so bad about being a new Singapore off the shore 
of Europe?” Carswell’s sceptics think that the modern era 
transcends geography, uniting the world economically and 
politically in the cloud. The countries they admire the most – 
such as Australia, Dubai and Singapore – have successfully 
managed to carve out a global role without being hung up on 
trying to shape the world. The intellectual rationale for this 
move is that while Britain may enter a “new Elizabethan age” 
where it retains a global outlook, it should refuse to be drawn 
into disputes about the shape of the European continent.  
Behind the UKIP case, the fresh start and the technological 
is a modern-sounding argument that has a different tone to 
the blimpish isolationism of euroscepticism past. Settlers are 
being targeted with the fear that their neighbourhoods are 
being transformed by a wave of migration from new member 
states. Prospectors are told of the economic threat of the euro 
crisis and the burdens of regulation. And Pioneers are told that 
Europe is a bureaucratic monolith in an age of global networks.
A Changed European Union
One of the reasons that the new narratives are hitting home is 
that the EU is outgrowing the old stories. The old explanation 
for EU unpopularity was that there is a democratic deficit 
within the EU – with decisions taken by unaccountable insti-
tutions rather than elected national governments. But the 
current crisis is not born of a clash between Brussels and the 
member states – but rather a clash between the democratic 
wills of citizens in northern and southern Europe.
In the past, there was an unwritten rule that EU institutions 
would police the single market and other technical areas 
of policy – from common standards for the composition 
of tomato paste to lawn-mower sound emissions – while 
national governments would continue to have a monopoly 
on the delivery of services and policy-making in the most 
sensitive areas.  
With the onset of the crisis, many creditor countries were 
unhappy taking responsibility for the debts of others without 
having mechanisms for controlling their spending. With the 
fiscal compact and the IMF letters, eurocrats have crossed 
many of the red lines of national sovereignty, extending their 
reach way beyond food safety standards to exert control over 
pensions, taxes, salaries, labour market, public jobs, etc. 
To an increasing number of citizens in southern European 
countries the EU looks like the IMF did in Latin America – a 
golden straightjacket that is strangling the space for national 
politics. 
But in more and more northern European countries, the EU 
is seen to have failed as a controller for the policies of the 
southern rim. The sense of victimhood of the creditors is 
matching that of the debtors.
In a national political system, political parties would be able 
to voice these different perspectives – and hopefully act as a 
referee and find common ground between them. But that is 
precisely what the European political system cannot deliver. 
Instead of a battle of ideas, the EU has been marred by a 
3vicious circle between anti-EU populism and technocratic 
agreements between member states that are afraid of their 
citizens. Some people think that the collapse in support for 
the EU is related to the economic cycle and that it will return 
along with growth and prosperity. But my analysis is that 
trust in the EU will not come back once the economy starts 
growing. The old division of labour between the EU and the 
member states has come to an end.
A Crisis of Political Representation
In this year’s European elections, unprecedented numbers 
of populist and Eurosceptic representatives were elected, 
from Denmark and Hungary to Germany and Greece, via 
the striking successes of UKIP and France’s Front National.
Voters flocked to a range of insurgent parties new and old – 
from former communists to the national front. Spain saw the 
launch of PODEMOS a Latin-American inspired party which 
grew out of a fraction called “Anti-capitalist Left” with a mis-
sion to work “to stop Spain being a colony of Germany and 
the Troika”. In Greece, the leftist Syriza party emerged as 
the largest group. In Poland there was a surge in support for 
the Law and Justice Part as well as creation of a radical new 
grouping, the Congress of the New Right. Why?
In Peter Kellner’s words: “The surge of insurgent parties is 
the political consequence of the economic trends that Tho-
mas Piketty described in his work on rising inequality.”
Although there are wide variations across Europe, two groups 
of voters showed up at polling stations in disproportionate 
numbers: urban voters from former industrial heartlands, 
who are at the sharp end of immigration, and rural voters put 
off by the liberal social values being adopted by mainstream 
parties of the centre left and right. 
These are groups that have largely been abandoned by the 
mainstream parties, which are becoming “cosmopolitan” and 
“metrosexual”. “Parties of the left now draw support mainly 
from public-sector workers and the cultural industries, while 
parties on right now mainly appeal to finance and big business.
A few years ago, the late political scientist Peter Mair, wrote 
a prescient article about the void that had opened where 
traditional politics used to be. It is this gaping void that the 
insurgent forces are trying to fill.  His metaphor works on 
many levels.
It applies, firstly to citizens have retreated into their private 
lives.  All of the indicators for traditional political participa-
tion are falling: party membership, political affiliation, turn-
out. And while today’s hyper-connected citizens are able to 
efficiently monitor the executive power on the internet and 
protest in lots of new and different ways, they tend to seek out 
ways to participate in politics as an experience rather than 
voting in elections.
Secondly, according to Mair, parties have vacated their tradi-
tional functions of expressing peoples’ views or representing 
them.  Political parties used to be embedded in civic life but 
they have become mere appendages of the state (a “govern-
ing class” that seeks office rather than a chance to represent 
ideas or groups in society). 
Thirdly, parties have vacated the realm of debate. Politics 
used to be about changing minds, but a revolution of politi-
cal technology has turned it into a very different pursuit: 
maximizing the turn-out of people that already agree with 
you. This was always part of traditional campaigning but the 
mining of big data has allowed it to happen on an industrial 
scale. The intellectual roots of this new type of politics lie 
in part in the work of Obama’s former colleague at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, Cass Sunstein, who worked in the White 
House until last year. Together with Richard Thaler, he wrote 
the influential book Nudge, which shows that it is easier to 
change people’s behavior than it is to change their minds. 
Central to that is manipulating what they call the “architec-
ture of choice” – in other words framing arguments on policy 
to appeal to existing biases rather than changing minds.
It is the political void created by the mainstream parties that 
the insurgent parties are trying to fill. They are recasting poli-
tics as a dispute between elites and the people, and are redis-
covering the forgotten roles of opposition and expression 
(rather than seeking to govern, in fact some parties such as 
Greece’s Syriza and the Dutch PVV have gone to great lengths 
to avoid going into government).  In many ways the European 
elections is the perfect vehicle for these parties as it is not an 
election that results in the election of a government, an act 
without consequence.
What does the Eurosceptic surge mean?
The Eurosceptic surge has not had a dramatic affect on the 
composition of the European Parliament and the mainstream 
parties are more cohesive than the insurgents – although 
people who study that body more closely than I do worry 
about the impact on further EU integration as well as the 
ratification of trade deals.  If the community method becomes 
more difficult, pro-Europeans are likely to focus ever more 
on delivering highly sensitive political integration through 
emergency powers and intergovernmental treaties, thereby 
excluding the European Commission and the European Par-
liament even further. In other words, integration will be by 
stealth – that is, through the back door provided by the Euro-
pean Council – rather than in the open. This could fragment 
the EU, erode the acquis communautaire, and create tensions 
between the institutions and between euro-ins and euro-out 
countries.  
But, the real danger of the Eurosceptics is the way that they 
may influence the agenda of the mainstream parties, both 
in Europe and at home. The policy positions of previously 
“mainstream” parties on the European issue have already 
hardened as a response to the rise of Euroscepticism. For 
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example, it is now often hard to distinguish the positions 
of the British Conservative Party from those of UKIP. In fact, 
Farage says his goal is as much to change the position of 
mainstream parties as to win power himself – and he seems 
so far to be succeeding.
The Eurosceptic surge in the European elections could 
reduce even further the appetite for “more Europe” of some 
key member state governments. This is a particular problem 
on the crucial issue of eurozone governance. Plans to com-
plete Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) require strength-
ening EU powers and even a new treaty, but the strength of 
the populists at home may deter policymakers from ceding 
more sovereignty or from embarking on treaty change, which 
in many EU member states will require a referendum. The 
more progress is made in completing EMU, the more we are 
likely to find governments succumbing to the temptation of 
compensation for more European integration with stronger 
measures to restrict freedom of movement. 
The danger is that the response of the mainstream parties 
will be to retreat into technocratic co-operation and seek to 
continue business as usual. Instead, rather than forming a 
pro-European bloc, they should try to create the space for 
political battles between competing visions of Europe and 
thereby try to preserve left–right competition at both national 
and European levels.
That will mean developing:
1. more imaginative ideas on migration, solidarity and 
responsibility;
2. a new agenda for growth, responsible capitalism and 
social protection; 
3. and an agenda for self-government that shows how the EU 
is part of the solution to the problems of the twenty-first 
century – from dealing with big data to the rise of China. 
The challenge is to drive wedges between the Eurosceptics 
rather than encouraging them to form an anti-elite bloc. 
In order to do this, the mainstream centre-left and centre- 
right parties will need to do much more to acknowledge the 
Eurosceptic critique of Europe while rejecting the solutions 
the Eurosceptics propose. Whether they blame it for auster-
ity or uncontrolled immigration, a significant number of 
Europeans are angry at the EU because it has not worked as 
they expected. The euro has been saved, but at a great cost 
in growth, jobs, and divisions between citizens and elites, 
debtors and creditors, and euro-ins and euro-outs.
 
If Europe is to defeat the Eurosceptics, it has to confront them 
at home, where they will be stronger, and not only in Brus-
sels, where they will be weaker. They will also need to pay 
attention to the new cleavages that have emerged throughout 
the crisis, such as the one dividing debtors and creditors and 
euro-ins and euro-outs. In short, Europe needs more politics 
and more disagreements. Rather than huddling together, 
mainstream parties need to give people real choices and 
address the issues that really concern people.
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